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BRENDA CHRISTINE WHITE, ) 
( Case No. 20090322 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The decision of the Court of Appeals (and the trial court) being challenged 
and requested to be overturned by this Court require that before an accused may 
present the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress to the jury she must 
demonstrate a highly provocative and contemporaneous triggering event as a 
prerequisite to relying on the defense. Ms. White insists the decisions by the 
courts below are in error. 
The State responds that the Court of Appeals decision does not change the 
law despite the acknowledgement that "Utah cases have not used that precise 
verbal formulation." Brief of Respondent at 13. To support its position the State 
relies on a number of cases and arguments that Ms. White urges are not helpful to 
this analysis and which understate the facts presented and proffered in support of 
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the affirmative defense, ignore an accused's right to present her defense and 
denies the critical role the jury plays in her right to a fair and impartial trial. 
This Court should find the facts of this case as outlined in her opening brief 
to be more than sufficient evidence to meet the correct standard of presenting the 
case to the jury on the defense of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5-10. 
Ms. White relies on the argument submitted in her opening brief as well as 
the following reply. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AN 
ACCUSED IS REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE A HIGHLY 
PROVOCATIVE AND CONTEMPORANEOUS TRIGGERING 
EVENT AS A PREREQUISITE TO PRESENTING THE 
STATUTORY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF EXTREME 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS TO THE JURY. 
This Court recently decided important guidelines to determine the 
appropriateness of a request for an affirmative defense instruction. As only 
partially recognized by the State in its answer, extreme emotional distress 
manslaughter or attempted manslaughter law has changed. Brief of Respondent at 
17-20. Extreme emotional distress manslaughter is no longer a lesser included 
offense of murder or attempted murder charges, but since 1999 are now 
affirmative defenses to the charges. The change, in large part unaddressed by the 
State, is important to this Court's decision as much of the argument of the State 
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relies on prior case law and arguments which predate the analysis and are not 
applicable authority in our matter before the Court. This Court explained: 
Under the plain language of Utah's murder and manslaughter statutes, 
extreme emotional distress manslaughter and imperfect self-defense 
manslaughter are affirmative defenses to murder. They are no longer lesser 
included offenses of murder. For this reason, we do not discuss whether 
the State was entitled to jury instructions for extreme emotional distress 
manslaughter and imperfect self defense manslaughter based upon our 
prior case law regarding lesser included offenses. Rather, we are bound 
by the legislature's decision to categorize extreme emotional distress 
manslaughter and imperfect self-defense manslaughter as affirmative 
defenses to murder. 
State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, \ 24, 192 P.3d 867, 876 (emphasis added).1 The 
significance of that change for Ms. White and her Petition to this Court is that in 
delineating when a court properly instructs on an affirmative defense of extreme 
emotional distress this Court provides its guidance as follows: 
When a criminal defendant requests a jury instruction regarding a 
particular affirmative defense, the court is obligated to give the instruction 
if evidence has been presented-either by the prosecution or by the 
defendant-that provides any reasonable basis upon which a jury could 
conclude that the affirmative defense applies to the defendant. See State v. 
Knoll, 712 P.2d211, 214 (Utah 1985) <"[W]hen there is abasis in the 
evidence, whether the evidence is produced by the prosecution or by the 
defendant, which would provide some reasonable basis for the jury to 
conclude that a killing was done to protect the defendant from an imminent 
threat of death by another, an instruction on self-defense should be given 
the jury."); State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980) (stating that a 
party is "entitled to have the jury instructed on the law applicable to its 
theory of the case if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify 
if) . 
1. The State's reliance on State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256 (Utah App. 1995); State v. 
Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861 (Utah 1998); and State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 624 (Utah 
1983) are unhelpful because they were decided before the legislative change and 
are not affirmative defense cases. Ms. White's opening brief also includes 
arguments why they are further distinguishable from the analysis required herein. 
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Id. at % 25 (emphasis added). This Court added the additional clarification and 
examples of appropriate applications of this change from a lesser included analysis 
to a requested affirmative defense instruction. This Court instructed: 
We have applied this rule with respect to the affirmative defenses of 
imperfect self-defense manslaughter and extreme emotional distress 
manslaughter. See State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ffi[ 16, 23, 152 P.3d 315; 
State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, fflj 13, 14, 63 P.3d 94. For example, in 
Spillers, we held that a criminal defendant was entitled to a jury instruction 
on imperfect self-defense manslaughter because the evidence presented by 
the defendant could have been interpreted by the jury to establish 
imperfect self-defense. 2007 UT 13, % 23, 152 P.3d 315. We also held that 
the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on extreme emotional 
distress manslaughter because "a rational jury could, adopting Defendant's 
version of events, find that he was experiencing extreme emotional distress 
for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse when he shot [the 
victim]." Id. H 16. 
Id. at Tf 26 (emphasis added).2 
As discussed in her opening brief, Ms. White maintains that State v. 
Spillers HIT 2007 UT 13, 152 P.3d 315, and State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 63 
P.3d 94, assist in demonstrating the error of the Court of Appeals and the trial 
court in this matter. 
In Shumway the Court described the circumstances as follows: 
One interpretation of the evidence supports the necessity for a 
manslaughter instruction under subsection (3)(a)(i). Brookes [the 
defendant] disclosed to police that on the morning of the altercation 
Christopher was irritated at him for beating Christopher at video games. As 
2
 This Court did not require the jury instruction in Low's case as he did not request 
that instruction be offered as his defense and only the State had urged the 
affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress over his objection. Low, 2008 
UT58@^26 . 
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the boys went to bed, Christopher went to the kitchen and retrieved a knife 
that he began to throw in the air and catch. Christopher then lunged at 
Brookes and began poking him with the knife. The boys wrestled over 
control of the knife and in his anger, Brookes stabbed Christopher. 
Brookes also suffered stab wounds to his hand. There was evidence that 
Christopher had a reputation for being a "hothead" and losing his temper, 
while Brookes was known to be cooperative and peaceful. Other evidence 
supported the argument that Brookes had been bullied and pushed around 
by his peers since he was in the third grade, and that all of this "came out 
on Chris" when the boys fought over the knife. 
Id. at f 10. The facts revealed that Shumway was 15 years old at the time of the 
murder; third graders are 8 or 9 years of age so this particular—and determined to 
be a relevant—distress factor relied on by the Court in Shumway was six or seven 
years old. Similarly the Court spoke of reputation evidence which by practical 
definition cannot be created from a single event but must necessarily be 
ascertained over time. 
This Court recognized in Shumway that circumstances which may have 
occurred years prior to the offense could certainly contribute to the defendant's 
mental state at the time of the offense, and likewise could be considered by a jury 
in determining whether the defendant acted under the influence of "extreme 
emotional distress for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse." The 
Court reversed the murder conviction in Shumway because the jury was not 
instructed appropriately and because the jury was not allowed to determine the 
reasonableness of the defendant's acts under those stressors. 
In State v. Spillers. 2005 UT App. 283, 116 P.3d 985, affd 152 P.3d 315 
(Utah 2007), the State had appealed the Court of Appeal's decision claiming that 
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court erred in reversing the conviction because of the trial court's failure to give an 
extreme emotional distress instruction. The State claimed, as the State does here, 
that Spillers did not merit the instruction. This Court responded to the State's 
argument that it remakes here as follows: 
[T]he State's assertion rests on its own conclusion that Defendant acted 
"rationally" throughout the encounter; however, the question of whether 
Defendant acted "rationally" is a question of fact properly belonging to 
the jury. While a jury could adopt the State's version of events and convict 
Defendant of murder, a jury could also believe Defendant's interpretation 
of the evidence and conclude that he was not acting rationally, but rather 
was under extreme emotional distress as a result of Jackson's attack and 
convict on the lesser offense of manslaughter. 
Second, the State contends that Defendant did not present evidence that he 
was in fact experiencing "extreme emotional distress." Rather, the State 
maintains that Defendant merely testified that he felt nervous and that the 
blow to his head left him feeling cloudy, dazed, uncomfortable, and scared-
terms not indicative, in the State's view, of extreme emotional distress. 
State v. Spillers Till 152 P.3d 315, 2007 UT 13, Tj Tj 18-19. The trial court's 
conclusions, similar to the State's position in Spillers II, rests on the conclusion 
that defendant acted rationally and had a plan. Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law at 5 -in Opening Brief of Appellant at Addendum C. As this Court stated 
in Spillers II, whether Ms. White acted rationally here is a question of fact 
properly presented to the jury. 
In contrast, and demonstrating the trial court's error here, this Court in 
Spillers II characterized those same facts as follows: 
Like Shumway this case could be interpreted to support Defendant's 
contention that he experienced extreme emotional distress and was 
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therefore entitled to a manslaughter instruction. Defendant testified that he 
and Jackson were arguing prior to the altercation and that Jackson was 
upset with him, accusing him of snitching to drug enforcement officers. 
The tone of the conversation made Defendant nervous. Defendant stated 
that Jackson retrieved a firearm and struck Defendant on the back of the 
head. Defendant testified that the blow left him cloudy, dazed, 
uncomfortable, and scared. According to the nurse's testimony, the blow 
may have resulted in a two-inch hematoma that was present on Defendant's 
head the day after the shooting. Defendant testified that after being struck, 
he turned to face Jackson, who was cocking his arm back to strike 
Defendant again. At that point, Defendant shot Jackson three times, 
although at trial he testified that he remembered firing only a single shot. 
Further, witnesses testified that Jackson had a reputation for violence. 
Thus, a rational jury could, adopting Defendant's version of events, find 
that he was experiencing extreme emotional distress for which there was a 
reasonable explanation or excuse when he shot Jackson. 
Id. at ]f 16. Ms. White's case, like that of Shumway, relies on the initiating 
incident only as the starting point for the analysis allowing the jury to determine 
the reasonableness, if any, to the claimed affirmative defense. Again, distress and 
the factors which create it, are acquired over time, permitting something less than 
a single highly provocative triggering event to justify granting the defense. The 
trial court's opinion to the contrary is erroneous as is the Court of Appeals 
decision affirming that ruling. R. 652; Appellant's Opening Brief at Addendum C 
p. 5. 
The State and the lower courts focus primarily on the fact that Ms. White 
reacted to her ex-husband's use of a cell phone as the important and insufficient 
triggering fact which then justifies the decision to deny the requested affirmative 
defense instruction. Brief of Respondent at 26. Much more has been proffered to 
the court and would be presented at trial as detailed in the factual statement of the 
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opening brief Importantly, however, the trial court included only a few of those 
arguments in the findings and conclusions it reached in denying Ms. White's 
motion in limine. 
The facts which built over time then causing her on April 26, 2006, to lose 
control because of her overwhelming feelings of anger, agitation and distress are 
contained in her opening brief. See Opening Brief of Appellant at pp. 5-10 and 
repeated here in the reply brief in Addendum A. 
The trial court's conclusion to deny Ms. White her requested affirmative 
defense instruction and deciding that there was no rational basis in the evidence 
for that theory not only usurps the duties of the jury but unfairly denies her the 
right to present her statutory and constitutional right to her affirmative defense to 
have the jury determine the reasonableness of her actions. 
This Court has acknowledged, as quoted above, that the instruction is 
required to be given any time a rational jury could, adopting the Defendant's 
counting of the events, find that she was experiencing extreme emotional distress 
for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse. 
As noted, this Court required an instruction on the affirmative defense of 
self-defense to be given in State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 264, 266 (Utah 
1988), based on the defendant's theory of self-defense where he had stabbed the 
victim 107 times. Again, this Court further explained and also held that a 
defendant would be entitled to an instruction on extreme emotional distress 
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manslaughter where the victim had been stabbed twenty-seven times and died of 
multiple critical wounds. State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750? 753-55 (Utah 1986). See 
also, State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980)(where the defendant's 
evidence, although in material conflict with the State's proof, is such that the jury 
may entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's theory, she is entitled to 
have the jury instructed fully and clearly on the affirmative defense if there is any 
basis in the evidence to support that theory); State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 44-45 
(Utah App.l990)(a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of 
the crime if there is any basis in the evidence to support that theory). 
Ms. White insists there is ample basis in the evidence developed thus far, 
and even additional evidence to be developed/ to support her theory of the 
affirmative defense that she suffered from extreme emotional distress for which 
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse at the time of the criminal events as 
alleged by the State in this matter. 
Also critical in this analysis is the reminder that this Court provided when 
reviewing the appellate court's decision in Spillers II. The Court reminded us as 
follows: 
[A] defendant in a criminal case bears no burden of persuasion. "The 
ultimate burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
3
 Ms. White refers to the fact that the trial court indicated its willingness to allow 
the alleged victim to be deposed and the answers to the questions desired at the 
preliminary hearing (and others) obtained from Jon White. R. 713 at 15. Such 
questions would undoubtedly develop additional information in support of the type 
and depth of stressors placed on Ms. White. Due to the current posture of the 
case, however, such a deposition has yet to occur. 
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remains on the state, whether defendant offers any evidence in an effort to 
prove affirmative defenses or not." ... Accordingly, a defendant is not 
required to use particular language or key words in his testimony to 
identify his mental state as extreme emotional distress before a jury may 
consider that defense in a criminal trial. As long as the evidence presented 
at trial supports a defendant's theory of the crime and provides a rational 
basis for a verdict on the lesser included offense, a defendant is entitled to 
the jury instruction if he requests it. 
Spillers II, 152 P.3d 315, 2007 UT 13, If 19 (citations omitted). 
Accordingly, as Ms. White has urged, this Court has already recognized 
that there are factors or events that may have occurred long before the offense 
which are relevant and therefore appropriately must be considered by a jury in 
determining whether an accused has acted under the influence of "extreme 
emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse." The 
initiating event need not be a violent or tumultuous event. All that is required is 
that there be "some external initiating circumstance" bringing out the distress 
accompanied by extremely unusual and overwhelming stress such that a 
reasonable person under that stress as viewed under the then existing 
circumstances would have an extreme emotional reaction to it. This determination 
in this case is a question for the jury to decide. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. White is entitled to her theory of the defense if any evidence supports it 
from which the jury could return such a verdict. In Ms. White's case, no single 
violent event triggered her behavior. Rather a loss of self control arguably 
occurred due to a lengthy repeated and escalating pressure overborne by intense 
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feelings such as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation and similar 
emotions. These stressors very realistically were extreme and overwhelming for 
someone under the then existing circumstances reasonably brought about over 
time by the external forces of Jon White's behavior towards her, coupled with the 
escalating financial pressures and extreme family and work stressors, including the 
death of her doctor and counselor and the changes in her medicine regime. Her 
circumstances meet the requirements of submitting the affirmative defense of 
extreme emotional distress to the jury. 
The Court of Appeals decision sweeps too broadly and forecloses too many 
from the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress and should be 
overturned by this Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \U day of November, 2009. 
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Proffered Facts (from Opening Brief) 
An in-chambers discussion occurred where the defense proffered the 
testimony of certain actions and events which the ex-husband employed over the 
more recent period of the marriage to manipulate and distress Ms. White. R. 711 
at 74-82. This testimony included Jon White's treatment of Ms. White through the 
marriage, including a rather recent period of Jon White's marital infidelity, an 
extra-marital affair with a co-worker. R. 711 at 75-76. The defense also proffered 
an instance later in the marriage documented by a police investigation and report 
of the possession and use/abuse of child pornography by Jon White. R. 711 at 73-
75. Additionally, the defense introduced a proffer describing a sexual tryst the ex-
husband had arranged where he orchestrated a "threesome" with yet another co-
worker and Ms. White. R. 711 at 74-80. 
Other problems existed in the marriage and more specifically the 
dissolution of the marriage and were proffered to the district court in support of 
the motion in limine. R. 714. Ms. White and the children were not receiving any 
financial support from Jon White from the time he left at Thanksgiving of 2005 
and she was forced to make a mediation agreement in January to settle the divorce 
on the promise of getting some money to support the family. Poor legal advice 
assured her that giving up monthly income via alimony, house and bill payments 
was a fair trade for his half of the equity in the home. R. 443-50. There were no 
temporary orders obtained by her lawyer to provide for interim payments and the 
settlement agreement signed in January provided none, except for child support 
beginning in March. Id. 
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Ms. White was on medications for anxiety, depression and sleep. R. 444. 
During this time Jon White was to provide health coverage for the family but on 
two separate occasions he cancelled the coverage causing a lapse in her ability to 
acquire the medication which resulted in an increase in her anger, her depression 
and all that went with it. Ms. White, on one occasion, was required to go to Jon 
White's workplace herself to have the insurance benefits reinstated. In the 
meantime she was without her medications. She had no money to pay for them. 
Moreover, she deteriorated in her mental state and ability to deal with all that was 
going on around her. Id. 
She was a single mother of two children working a $ 12.50 cent an hour 
job, at a telephone call center, with new financial obligations of approximately $ 
1,400.00 per month on a first and second mortgage, plus credit card debt resulting 
from the marriage of another $ 200.00 to $ 300.00 per month and all the other 
family expenses. R. 433, 443-450. 
Ms. White had to increase her work from part-time to full time; and in fact, 
began to work overtime—often working up to as much as 60-70 hours a week to 
try and make ends meet. Id. Ms. White saw less of her children than before which 
resulted in additional stressors from the children. And at the same time, Jon White 
began to withdraw from participating with the children. R. 446. Jon White would 
make the visits difficult for Ms. White; for example, he would insist on an 8 o' 
clock pickup of the children on times when he knew Ms. White was in a group 
counseling class that did not terminate until 8 p.m. Id. He would require that Ms. 
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White leave the counseling sessions early to pick up the children at 8 p.m., rather 
than waiting until 8:15 p.m., or he would require her to arrange for someone else 
to do so. 
As money became more difficult her ability to pay for medications 
decreased and her doctor assisted by providing sample packets of the medications 
whenever she could. However, that doctor died in early April leaving her without 
a treatment doctor and without appropriate medication. R. 446-47; 711 at 79. 
The mediation agreement, determined in January, to eventually become the 
divorce settlement, still left her without finances. The unfortunate settlement 
provided that Ms. White would receive the equity in the home, but would be 
required to pay from that equity an approximated additional $ 10,000.00 of debt 
accumulated during the marriage. Of course, she had to pay these bills in the 
interim, while waiting for the settlement date to arrive. R. 447. 
While the settlement agreement would provide Ms. White with child 
support of approximately $ 650.00 per month, no relief was in sight. R. 447. She 
fell behind in house and bill payments despite working so much overtime. As part 
of the settlement agreement urged on her by her counsel, Jon White insisted that 
he not participate in paying the house payments and that he surrender his half of 
the equity in trade for no alimony and no payments. Id. 
The unfortunate reality of the settlement was that the equity she now had in 
the home was of no value unless she could get the money out and pay the living 
expenses, mortgages and other bills. Id. If she could not refinance the mortgages 
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and get the equity out to live on she could even lose the house. Ms. White began 
to see the potential of this reality after the settlement and her finances did not 
improve. R. 447-48. She desired to refinance the home to free up that money to 
live on and pay the bills as anticipated in the agreement. However, due to her 
short work history, large debt and late payments, Ms. White could not get a loan to 
refinance the home. Ms. White approached Jon White for the assistance with the 
refinance that he had promised, and he vacillated and backed out of his agreement 
to do so. R. 447-48; 711 at 33-35. 
Ms. White could not obtain the refinancing without him. Id. 
She finally contacted new counsel and discussed attempting to re-open the 
divorce agreement as unworkable. R. 444, 448. 
Jon White then agreed to assist with the refinance but then he would back 
out again. R. 448. 
The relationship between Jon White and the children became more 
problematic. He spent less time with them, disappointed them more and was 
unavailable for contact. Ms. White requested that he provide his cell phone 
number to her so the kids could contact him directly, but he repeatedly told her 
that he did not have one. R. 448-49. He was becoming less and less involved in 
caring for and caring about his family. Id. 
The day of the incident, April 26th, Ms. White went to Jon White's 
workplace earlier in the day to speak with him and have him talk on the phone to 
the mortgage broker. He refused to do so until later in the day. When she went 
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back the second time, he spoke with the mortgage broker but he would not 
cooperate in the refinance. R. 711 at 33-34. 
During the second visit Ms. White spoke with Jon White again about the 
refinance of the mortgages and assisting in providing for his children. Ms. White 
felt he had promised to assist her in releasing the equity from the home. R. 448. 
When Ms. White saw Jon White leave the workplace talking on a cell 
phone, a cell phone that he denied owning for communication with the children. 
Ms. White was overcome with all that has been described above. R. 449. Her 
anger, agitation, loss, grief and the disappointment for her and the children 
resulted in her inability to control herself. Those emotions controlled her actions. 
R. 448-49. 
These events and others including the fact that Ms. White was only recently 
aware that Jon White now was actively dating the co-worker with whom he had 
the affair, were at the base of the defense theory of the case supporting the request 
to permit the defense of extreme emotional distress to the jury. R. 447-49. All of 
these events were described as occurring within the last two to three years, some 
even more recent in time and prior to the offenses in question. R. 711 at 76. 
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